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JUSTIFICATION NORMS UNDER UNCERTAINTY: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
Claire A. Hill∗
People making decisions under uncertainty may need to justify those
decisions to their reputational community. This Essay considers when and
how the potential need to justify might lead a decision-maker to employ a
methodology better suited to yielding a justifiable choice that may not be
the best choice. When a decision involves uncertainty, the possible
outcomes and probabilities are not known. A broad consensus about a
methodology that produces a good decision often may not exist.
But
norms will often arise as to acceptable methodologies—that is,
methodologies that will be accepted as justifiable if justification is needed.
The norms instantiate considerable stickiness – after all, the best way to
demonstrate that something is (typically) “done” is to show that relevant
others “do it.” This Essay identifies a particular pathology associated
with the practice of favoring a justifiable decision over a “good” one, and
argues that this pathology can have significant negative consequences.
The main example discussed is the volume of subprime securities
purchased. Other examples include the process by which CEOs are
selected, and decisions regarding contract terms in complex business
contracts.
“The acceptability heuristic is, perhaps, the least inspiring strategy for
coping with accountability. This strategy does, however, have obvious
adaptive value for the individual decision-maker.”1
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Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice:
Toward a Social Contingency Model, in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 331, 348 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992).
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Investors bought enormous quantities of subprime mortgage
securities when they were the hot new thing; the financial crisis began
when the securities plummeted in value. Investors’ reasons for buying the
securities were not based on a careful appraisal of the securities.2 Rather,
the investors relied on what others said and did, even when their reliance
was not warranted.3 If more investors had done their own appraisals, the
crisis might not be as severe. Indeed, if enough investors had done their
own appraisals, the crisis might not have occurred. This Essay argues that
the strategy investors followed – reliance on others – was adopted more to
help them justify to others whatever results their investments yielded than
to genuinely arrive at the best substantive decision. This Essay also argues
that when enough individuals follow such a strategy, society may suffer.
One might think that the potential need to justify ex post should
naturally lead to better ex ante decisions. After all, the better a decision is
ex ante, the less likely an ex post justification will be needed. But in a
class of cases involving decision-making under uncertainty, the potential
need to justify may not lead to better decisions. Instead, it may lead to
decisions that yield negative externalities and other social costs. It may
also prevent the accretion of useful information, as well-worn strategies
that provide justification are used in lieu of strategies aimed directly at
making the best decision. The enormous volume of subprime securities
purchased, and the consequent crisis, provides an important example.
The phenomenon of focusing as much or more on potentially
justifying a decision as on making the best decision is exceedingly
common. This Essay considers when and how the potential need to justify
might lead a decision-maker to employ a methodology better suited to
yielding a justifiable choice that may not be the best choice. The intuition
is simple to articulate. When a decision involves uncertainty, the possible
outcomes and probabilities are not known. A broad consensus about a
methodology that produces a good decision often may not exist.
But
norms will often arise as to acceptable methodologies—that is,
methodologies that will be accepted as justifiable if justification is needed.4
2

See generally, MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT (2010).
See id.
4
The contrast between decisions supported by “good” justifications and those
supported by “acceptable” justifications that are not also “good” justifications
unrealistically assumes that there are clear ways to determine what counts as a
3
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The norms instantiate considerable stickiness – after all, the best way to
demonstrate that something is (typically) “done” is to show that relevant
others “do it.”
Justifications may need to be directed to any or all of the
following: courts, regulators, self-regulatory bodies, colleagues, clients, or
the “court of public opinion.” What makes a justification acceptable differs
for different groups. This Essay addresses justifications to one’s colleagues
or clients, or, more broadly, to one’s reputational community, and leaves
other focuses of justification to later work. In that regard, the examples
used in this Essay relate to business decisions. The phenomenon is not
confined to business, but business is a convenient port of entry. Business
actors are continually judged by their reputational community, including
people in a position to offer rewards such as promotions or bonuses, or
punishments such as firing or demotion. The reputational community of
such actors has a rich set of norms for acceptable justifications—norms that
business actors abide by.
That business actors may “herd” or abide by social norms or
established practices is a commonplace observation. This Essay identifies
a particular pathology associated with that practice, in disparate but
common contexts, decision-makers’ potential need to justify decisions
made under uncertainty, and argues that this pathology can have significant
negative consequences. The goal of this Essay is to provoke inquiry as to
the breadth of the problem identified, as well as possible solutions.
This Essay proceeds as follows: Section 2 articulates the problem.
It distinguishes uncertainty from risk, comparing the need for and
availability of justifications in both cases. Section 3 discusses the
motivating example, the purchase of highly-rated subprime securities by
institutional investors. Section 4 discusses several additional examples;
one is the process by which CEOs are selected. The other examples
involve decisions regarding contract terms, choice of state of incorporation,
and the purchase of insurance. Section 5 considers ways in which law
contributes to the problem. Section 6 makes preliminary suggestions for
solutions. Section 7 concludes.

“good” decision and methodology. While the assumption is ultimately unrealistic,
it is sufficient for purposes of this Essay.
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UNCERTAINTY DISTINGUISHED FROM RISK

In Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Frank Knight famously
distinguished uncertainty from risk:
…Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct
from the familiar notion of Risk, from which it has never
been properly separated. The term "risk," as loosely used
in everyday speech and in economic discussion, really
covers two things which, functionally at least, in their
causal relations to the phenomena of economic
organization, are categorically different. . . . The essential
fact is that "risk" means in some cases a quantity
susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is
something distinctly not of this character; and there are farreaching and crucial differences in the bearings of the
phenomenon depending on which of the two is really
present and operating. . . . It will appear that a measurable
uncertainty, or "risk" proper, as we shall use the term, is so
far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in
effect an uncertainty at all. We shall accordingly restrict
the term "uncertainty" to cases of the non-quantitative
type.5
Knight notes that in conditions of uncertainty, “no valid basis of
any kind for classifying instances” exists.6 This statement is, in some
meaningful sense, an exaggeration: there is always some valid basis for
classification.7
Indeed, a valid basis for classifying instances of
5

FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19–20 (1921).
Id at 225.
7
“Classification” as used here is synonymous with “categorization;”the latter
term is more commonly used in the literatures dealing most directly with the area,
notably psychology. See generally Arthur B. Markman & Brian H. Ross, Category
Use and Category Learning, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 592, 592–93 (2003) (providing
a definition of “categories”)”); Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts,
Categories and Compliance in the Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151,
1185–98 (2010) (discussing linguistic and legal categories in the context of
regulatory regimes); Claire A. Hill, Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of
6
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uncertainty exists. Thus, the difference between risk and uncertainty is, in
an important respect, quantitative rather than qualitative. There is a
continuum of more-or-less valid bases for “classifying instances.”
At the uncertainty end of the continuum, there are, in Donald
Rumsfeld’s famous words, “unknown unknowns.”8 At the risk end of the
continuum, there are (wholly) valid bases for classifying instances: the
classification yields an identifiable and determinate set of instances as to
which we know the possible outcomes and associated probabilities. Thus,
a risk, in the true sense of the word, can easily be assessed using a
straightforward arithmetic computation typically known as “expected
value.” Few things are at the extreme end of the continuum- an exception
is the stylized gambles used in experiments. But many things are close
enough. A pool of prime mortgages is (or at least before the financial
crisis, was) a notable example. The performance of prime mortgages has
been tracked extensively for at least the last 40 years.9 Of course,
notwithstanding its colloquial use to the contrary, “risk” is not synonymous
with “high risk.” Treasury securities are technically “risky” although they
are commonly referred to (and thought of) as being risk-free or nearly so.
Natural disasters are at the uncertainty end of the continuum.
Which is the better classification to enable us to make predictions, the
broader set of natural disasters or a subset of specific such disasters? (And:
what counts as a natural disaster?) Moreover, even for a classification that
is straightforward, considerable uncertainty can exist: how well can we
predict the damage hurricanes will cause in 2012? Uncertainty makes it
difficult to assess how much to spend insuring against the possibility of all
or particular natural disasters, or how much to pay for investments that
constitute bets on the occurrence of such disasters.10
In an idealized (and of course highly unrealistic) paradigm of
decision-making, these difficulties do not arise. A decision maker can
Behavioral Law and Economics, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 563, 573–76 (2004) (discussing
the relevance of categorization for law and economics and behavioral law and
economics).
8
Michael R. Gordon, Rumsfeld, A Force for Change, Did Not Change With
the Times Amid Iraq Tumult, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006,
9
See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1119 (1996).
10
Investments that constitute bets on the occurrence of natural disasters are
called “catastrophe bonds” or colloquially, “cat bonds.” See Glossary of Economic
and Finance Terms, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/smm/a_f.htm#C.
(last visited Sept. 28, 2010).
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perform an accurate expected value computation – she chooses among
some determinate set of identified options, and knows the possible
outcomes and associated probabilities for each option. The strategy is a
good one from a substantive perspective. For the same reason, it is readily
justifiable.11 Consider a choice between option A, offering a 10% chance
of a $200,000 payoff and a 90% chance of a $4,000 payoff, and option B,
offering a 99.5% chance of a $12,000 payoff and a .5% chance of a $1000
payoff.
A choice of option A would be easy to justify: (.10x
$200,000+.90x $4000) > (.995x $12,000 +.005x $1000). 12 Even a choice
of B is justifiable, especially for a one-time gamble – the decision-maker
could claim risk-aversion. 13
Using this strategy requires that the outcomes and probabilities of
each option are known (and even more heroically, that the options
11

See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS
OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 62 (2006). This Essay uses “cost benefit analysis” and
“expected value” as though they were synonymous; while they clearly are not, for
purposes of the argument here, they can be treated as such.
12
Of course such a simple computation won’t often be possible. Even if a
computation of this sort is possible, the numbers will almost certainly be open to
argument.
13
Of course, proceeding in this manner is not infrequently controversial. One
common objection is that this approach is cold or unfeeling, or constitutes trying to
value something that inherently cannot be valued. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA
HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE
VALUE OF NOTHING 35–40 (2004). For a discussion of the issue in the context of
environmental law, see Richard L. Revesz, The green community should mend, not
work in vain to end, cost-benefit analysis, GRIST, (May 8, 2008, 09:12 AM),
http://www.grist.org/article/cost-benefit-environmentalism/ (promoting the use of
cost-benefit analyses in the context of environmental regulation); Lisa Heinzerling,
Lisa Heinzerling responds to Richard Revesz on cost-benefit analysis, GRIST, (May
14, 2008, 4:49 PM), http://www.grist.org/article/cost-benefit-environmentalisman-oxymoron/ (arguing against the use of cost-benefit analysis in the area of
environmentalism); Richard L. Revesz, Richard Revesz responds to Lisa
Heinzerling, defending cost-benefit anaylsis, GRIST, http://www.grist.org/article/atool-in-the-toolbox (June 5, 2008, 06:21 AM) (responding to Lisa Heinzerling’s
posting on Grist). A related objection is that quantification makes a decision seem
more well-supported than it is – to overstate, the inputs into the quantification may
be “garbage,” such that “garbage in, garbage out.” See Claire A. Hill, Law and
Economics in the Personal Sphere, 29 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 219, 224 (2004).
But, in principle it is a respectable method, and may come closest to commanding
the most general conceptual acceptance. Certainly, there is no obvious competitor.
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themselves are known), or at least known well enough. What if they are
not? How do we know what our choice set consists of? Even if we know
what the set consists of, how do we assess possible outcomes and the
associated probabilities for each member of the set? In fact, we almost
never “know” the appropriate elements of the canonical expected value
computation. 14 But not infrequently enough of a consensus exists as to
those elements, so that the computation can be done and defensibly used.
Any decision may need justification. Many factors bear on the
possibility that justification is required, including the likelihood and nature
of the possible bad outcomes (or foregone good outcomes). But closer to
the risk end of the spectrum, there is, in principle, a good and acceptable
justification in the form of expected value. Of course, many decisions raise
issues about what can and should be quantified, and what kinds of tradeoffs are acceptable.15 Consider decisions about whether to proceed with a
mass immunization program when the best evidence indicates that some
small number of people will suffer serious side effects from the
immunization.16
A particular decision may make a controversial
assumption about how to quantify the “cost” of the side effects. But the
assumption will be used to make the decision and to justify it: the good
justification and the acceptable justification are one and the same.
Closer to the uncertainty end of the continuum, we may not have a
decision methodology that is as accepted or good as expected value. By
definition, in cases of uncertainty, we cannot compute probabilities and
outcomes. The methodology thus is not available to help make the decision
or to provide a justification. How might a decision-maker react? There is
voluminous literature demonstrating the existence of “uncertainty
aversion,” or, as it is sometimes called, “ambiguity aversion.”17 People do
14

A computation of risk can be quite complex: we may only know secondorder probabilities, and even those only within certain ranges. But we may know
enough to make a computation in which we have significant confidence. If the
decision is one of a series of like decisions, we may have considerable confidence
in the aggregate results.
15
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 13.
16
See, e.g., CTRS. See, e.g., UPDATE: VACCINE SIDE EFFECTS, ADVERSE
REACTIONS, CONTRAINDICATIONS, AND PRECAUTIONS RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON IMMUNIZATION PRACTICES (ACIP), CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (1996), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/00046738.htm.
17
See, e.g., Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal
Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1495 (2006); Craig R. Fox & Amos
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not like uncertainty; they will pay money to avoid choosing in conditions
of uncertainty.18 Business actors do not have this option. They must make
a choice.
A decision-maker who faces uncertainty knows she may have to
justify her decision. Without a sound decision-making methodology to get
the best decision, without a way to assess how likely it is that the
justification will be needed, and especially when the downside of a bad
decision is potentially high, she will focus significantly on seeking a
justification that would be accepted by the relevant reference group.
In the stylized case of risk, there is by hypothesis a known and
accepted way to make the best substantive decision – expected value.19
The decision-maker may have to be ready to justify her decision, especially
if it potentially carries a significant downside risk. The need to justify does
not, however, change the decision she makes. Her decision-making
methodology should yield the best decision as well as the most justifiable
decision. By contrast, in the stylized case of uncertainty, there is no
known and accepted way to make the best substantive decision. The
decision-maker cannot accurately assess the probability that she will have
to justify the decision, but she cannot rule out that it might be high. She
therefore makes a decision that she is able to justify. What kinds of
Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q.J. ECON. 585,
585 (1995). A search on ssrn.com for “ambiguity aversion” in the title, abstract or
keywords yields 110 papers.
18
See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON.
643 (1961), (the seminal article addressing choices under conditions of
uncertainty.). See also Marciano Siniscalchi, Ambiguity and Ambiguity Aversion,
in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 138 (Steven N. Durlauf &
Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
19
Of course, there are few cases of pure risk or uncertainty. Moreover, the
situations in which an expected value computation is feasible, meaningful and
sufficiently uncontroversial are few and far between. Still, expected value is, as a
matter of rhetoric, a paradigmatic decision-making process in the realm of business
and has significant force in other realms, as well. That being said, in the political
realm—the realm which provides Tetlock’s framework of accountability in
Tetlock, supra note 1, - expected value might almost never be accepted in the
broader community to which a politician is accountable because the community is
intractably heterogeneous, the methodology might be too technical, there exists
insufficient consensus on the components of the computation, and, probably most
significantly, there may be many people who are either disingenuous in their nonacceptance or simply regard the outcome as the only thing of importance, such that
a bad outcome cannot be justified.
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decisions would a decision-maker be best able to justify? Decisions that
invoke history or authority seem well-suited to become the norm20 for the
relevant community. 21
Indeed, taking a step back, it should not be
surprising that such norms develop and persist: Decision-makers in a
reputational community are similarly situated vís-a-vís one another: they all
benefit from the existence of norms by which they can minimize their
expected costs. The result can be path dependence,22 stickiness,23 herd
behavior,24 and even groupthink.
B.

JUSTIFICATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ACCEPTABILITY
HEURISTIC
The foregoing discusses how people may justify less-than-good
outcomes of their decisions. This Section elaborates on the functions and
form of a justification.
20

On social norms generally, see H. Peyton Young, Social Norms, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 647.
21
What determines community boundaries, and how norms are adopted and
maintained in communities, are clearly relevant to the issues this Essay addresses,
but are beyond its scope. See generally Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language
and Norms in Complex Business Contracts 77, CHI. KENT. L. REV. 29 (2002)
(discussing the boundaries of the complex business transacting community).
22
See e.g., Steven N. Durlauf, Path Dependence, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 318.
23
The paradigmatic use of the term “stickyness” is in the context of wages and
prices. See THE ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/
alphabetic.cfm?TERM=STICKY%20PRICES#stickyprices (last visited Sept. 28,
2010). The term has, however, become broadly used in economics to refer to
behavior that changes more slowly than the standard forces in economics, such as
supply and demand, might predict.
24
See Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads,
Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL.
ECON. 992 (1992) (the seminal paper on herding and the related subject of
information cascades in finance). There is a rich literature on the subject. See, e.g,
Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Sushil Bikhchandani, Information
Cascades, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 18;
Andrea Devenow & Ivo Welch, Rational Herding in Financial Economics, 40
EUR. ECON. REV. 603 (1996); Torben Lütje, To Be Good Or To Be Better: Asset
Managers’ Attitudes Towards Herding, 19 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 825 (2009); David
Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital
Markets: A Review and Synthesis, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT 25 (2003); Ivo Welch,
Herding Among Security Analysts, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 369 (2000).
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Justifications are needed when people are, in Philip’s Tetlock term,
“accountable.”25
Expectations of accountability are an implicit or explicit
constraint on virtually everything people do . . . . Failure
to act in ways for which one can construct acceptable
accounts leads to varying degrees of censure, depending on
the gravity of the offense and the norms of the society.
Although one can make a powerful case for the
universality of accountability, the specific norms and
values to which people are held accountable vary
dramatically from one culture or time to another.26
Tetlock sets forth a taxonomy of strategies for coping with
accountability, including use of the “acceptability heuristic.”27 According
to Tetlock, people “adopt positions likely to gain the favor of those to
whom they feel accountable (a coping strategy labeled here as the
acceptability heuristic).”28 The acceptability heuristic is clearly a norm in
the relevant community. The heuristic has some benefits for both the
individual and groups to which the individual belongs.29 Moreover,
individuals are less likely to make certain mistakes if doing so would not
pass muster with the person to whom they are accountable.30 But it also
can have some “highly dysfunctional effects, from both an individual and
an organizational perspective. The acceptability heuristic implies that
decision-makers can be no better as well as no worse than the
constituencies to whom they are accountable.”31
This Essay articulates a particular pathology within the broader
phenomenon Tetlock describes. Uncertainty yields a need for justification,
but precludes “good” justifications. The community facing decisions made
under uncertainty develops norms of acceptable justifications (which are

25

Tetlock, supra note 1.
Id. at 337 (citations omitted).
27
See id. at 348–51.
28
Id. at 340 (explaining why people might adopt the acceptability heuristic,
Tetlock characterizes it as a “least effort solution” and notes that “[a]ll other things
being equal, people prefer [such] solutions.”)
29
Id. at 349.
30
Id.
31
Tetlock, supra note 1, at 349.
26
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“acceptability heuristics”).32 These justifications rely too much on history,
authority, and present practices, which yield bad decisions that perpetuate
themselves.33 The decisions at issue may be all made in the same time
period, as was the case with the purchase of subprime securities. Or they
may be made at different times, as in the CEO selection example and the
other examples of “sticky” corporate practices.
There may be many
individuals involved, or comparatively few. The individuals may be acting
in ways that favor their own interests at the expense of that of their
principal, typically their employer. Or they may be acting in ways
congruent with their employer’s interest.
In all of these cases, the
decisions yield real social costs – sometimes very large ones.
III.

THE MOTIVATING EXAMPLE

The example motivating this Essay arises from the financial crisis.
Money managers bought huge volumes of subprime securities, apparently
without doing sufficient investigation.
The decision as to whether an investment is worthwhile necessarily
involves making assumptions about the future. There will always be an
enormous amount we do not know, but we can sometimes have enough
information to provide a good basis for a decision. An investor purchasing
US Treasury securities can be well assured that she will be timely and fully
repaid. (Given the state of the economy, maybe she shouldn’t be!). If an
investor lends money to Bernie Madoff today, while he is in jail and there
are presumably many superior claims on his assets,34 the investor is
unlikely to be repaid. Even though nobody can fully predict the future, it
can sometimes be predicted well enough to enable a person making an
investment decision to do so with great confidence.
An investor making an investment decision assesses how she
expects the investment to perform. Canonically, she considers the possible
outcomes and associated probabilities.35 How much will the investment
pay off in good and bad states of the world? How likely are these
respective states? It is immediately obvious that the more of a basis one
has for these determinations, the better one’s valuation will be. It is also
32

See id. at 340.
See id. at 349–50.
34
See Diana B. Henriques, Claims Total Over 15,400 in Fraud by Madoff,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009, at B3.
35
See id.
33

38

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

obvious that, all else being equal, the newer and more complex the
instrument, the less of a basis one is likely to have.
Subprime mortgage securities and credit default swaps became
very popular investments in a short period of time, notwithstanding that
they were new and highly complex instruments.36 This is puzzling. It is
one thing for consumers to stand in line all night to buy iPhone4,37 but
sophisticated institutional investors are not supposed to respond to trends
simply by chasing them. They also are not supposed to chase trends they
do not understand. These investors are now saying, with some plausibility,
that they never understood the investments.38 A companion paper
discusses this puzzle and provides an explanation:
Investors bought complex securities they could not
properly value. Why did they pay such high prices? One
might think that they would instead discount for
uncertainty and demand a premium to compensate them in
case they were buying a lemon. Perhaps investors thought
the lemon securities had been sweetened because of the
sellers’ stake in their reputation—sellers, not wanting to
risk the loss of reputation and future business, would do
their best not to sell lemon securities. But an explanation
relying on the reputational stake of the sellers – the
investment banks – is insufficient. The time horizons of
many individuals selling on behalf of investment banks are
far shorter than those of their employers. Investment banks
have failed to sufficiently constrain the behavior of these
individuals. Moreover, it is generally known that the
investment banks themselves sometimes put their own
interests ahead of customers’.
Perhaps the investors were simply unfaithful agents
making investments for others. They could have made
36

See Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007, 3-4, 9, 20-30 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14358, 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14358.
37
Dawn Kawamoto, iPhone 4 Draws Long Lines, Entrepreneurs and
June
23,
2010,
Expectations
of
‘Wow!’,
DAILYFINANCE,
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/iphone-4-draws-early-lines-entrepreneurs-andexpectations-of-w/19527671/.
38
See generally LEWIS, supra note 2.
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self-interested decisions to get a quick payoff in the form
of fees or short-term results, calculating that the payoff
would exceed any long-term financial or reputational cost.
This explanation does not work either: it leaves
unanswered the question of why the ultimate investors
would not have chosen better agents or monitored them
more carefully…
Perhaps the investors simply relied on the rating agencies’
AAA ratings for the securities? This also seems unlikely,
given that Enron was scarcely in the distant past, and that
the securities offered higher yields than other AAA-rated
securities, indicating that they were of lower quality.
Moreover, during the latter part of the period in which
subprime securities were popular investments, the
securities’ low quality became sufficiently evident that
reliance on rating-agency ratings became progressively less
tenable. …
The most satisfactory explanation for why investors did
not demand a much larger lemons premium lies in the
incentives for “herding” among agents who made
investment decisions for others. Investors (and markets)
compare investment managers to other investment
managers. A manager’s best strategy, therefore, may be to
do what her peers do regardless of whether the manager
believes her peers are a reliable source of information
about the quality of the investment decision.39
These investors could have invested in ultra-conservative
instruments, but such a choice would lack an “accepted” justification – that
is not what their peer money managers “do.” For that matter, it would also
lack a “good” justification: a justification based on the merits of the
decision and the methodology used. Investors were hired for their
supposed expertise in investment selection – an expertise which was to

39

Claire A. Hill, Why Didn’t Subprime Investors Demand A (Much Larger)
Lemons Premium?, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 102-4 ( 2011) ations
omitted).
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yield expected returns above those of an insured bank deposit or Treasury
instrument.
Doing what their immediate peers (other money managers) did –
buying an investment crafted by other peers (the big investment banks with
involvement from their lawyers and vetted by still other peers, the rating
agencies) – was “accepted.” The money managers may also have believed
their peers knew what they were doing, that subprime mortgage securities
were sufficiently similar to the historically successful prime mortgage
securities, that housing prices would go up forever, and that brilliant
financial structuring could vastly minimize risk while keeping reward high.
Whatever the money managers believed about how the instruments would
perform, they knew the instruments’ performance (and their own
performance as money managers) was subject to considerable uncertainty.
Thus, they cared a great deal about the potential need for justification. For
money managers, justifying their decisions on the bases that their peers
performed no worse would be easier than justifying doing far worse
because they missed out on the hot new thing.40 We know the outcome of
these “safe” decisions (for the money managers): the financial crisis.
IV.

OTHER EXAMPLES

This section presents several additional examples. In these
examples, decision-makers use methodologies that the relevant community
uses, where there is significant reason to suppose that they do not
necessarily yield the best substantive decision. One example is selection of
the CEO. The other examples are of choice of state of incorporation,
providing for remote contingencies in a complex business contract, and
public company purchases of insurance. I discuss each example below. In
a recent article, I discussed another example related to my motivating
example here: the choice of two (or, in more recent years, two of three)
particular rating agencies for a debt issuance. I argued that a “CEO may
be second guessed if he does not get two ratings [one from Moody’s and
one from Standard & Poor’s] and the offering is disappointing; a downside

40

This ignores the contrarians who made bets against such securities and
others who simply didn’t get involved on either side. Such investors existed, but
there were comparatively few, such that subprime securities came to be
dangerously overvalued. See generally LEWIS, supra note 2.
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for not abiding by the norm is far more likely than any upside from flouting
it.”41
A.

CEO SELECTION

Another example where accepted justifications are sought as much
or more than good decisions (with “good” justifications) is the selection of
CEOs for larger companies – companies watched by the markets because
market participants have a significant stake in the companies’ performance.
How such companies will perform is uncertain for many reasons. The
economy’s performance is hard to predict, as are other potentially
significant factors, such as natural and man-made disasters. Industryspecific factors and the behavior of a company’s competitors are often
unpredictable. If the company does badly, those who selected the CEO
may be criticized.42 Thus, decision-makers may be highly influenced by
the potential need to justify when making their decisions as to who will be
CEO.43 According to Rakesh Khurana, a leading scholar in the field:
[B]oards employ extremely limiting criteria to define the
pool of eligible candidates. These criteria, which are
loosely (if at all) coupled to the specific strategic
challenges facing the firm, are adopted largely with the
intention of producing a candidate who will be seen as
legitimate by external constituents, namely, financial
analysts and the business media. . . . Because the directors
and candidates involved in external CEO search are
embedded in a community of overlapping business and
social relationships, they are particularly sensitive to

41

Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 43, 61
(2004). Fitch also became an acceptable source of one of the two ratings. See
Claire A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such A Bad Job Rating Subprime
Securities?, 71 PITT. L. REV. 585, 600-602 (2010).
42
See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, At G.M.’s Helm or Going Under?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006 (describing the pressure placed on the board of General
Motors when their choice for CEO underperformed in the position).
43
See, e.g., RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE
IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOS 29–36 (2002) (discussing the role of
justification in corporate searches for new CEOs).
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maintaining the appearance of propriety in the conduct of
the search among their peers.44
Each time a prominent company needs a CEO, it chooses from the
same small pool of candidates. This seems to be the accepted modus
operandi, if the company does badly under the new CEO, it permits those
involved to point to the process they followed, and be therefore absolved
from responsibility for the results of their decision. Khurana seems to
intimate that good quality is at least a necessary condition to be in the pool
of candidates.45 But perhaps good quality is not necessary – it may be that
previously being a CEO is sufficient.46
One might think that some past performances are so bad that they
should disqualify a possible candidate. If that is so, how can we explain
Robert Nardelli’s selection as the head of Chrysler after his performance at
Home Depot?47 In 2006, Joe Nocera of the New York Times wrote:
Mr. Nardelli . . . has become this year's version of Mr.
Overpaid C.E.O. He's earned this status, in part, by the
sheer sum of money his board has awarded him in the five
years since he was recruited from General Electric to take
over Home Depot: $245 million, including $37.1 million
just this last year. At the same time, Home Depot's stock
has fallen 12 percent, while shares of its chief competitor,
Lowe's, have risen 173 percent. You've heard of pay for
performance? This is the classic definition of pay for
pulse.48

44

Id. at 29, 36.
See id. at 27–30.
46
This, of course, is an overstatement – a CEO who is discovered committing
a massive fraud probably is no longer in the pool of acceptable CEOs. If he is in
jail, he is probably unavailable. “Chainsaw Al” Dunlap did not see a great demand
for his services after his disastrous and criminal stewardship of Sunbeam. See
JOHN A. BYRNE, CHAINSAW: THE NOTORIOUS CAREER OF AL DUNLAP IN THE ERA
OF PROFIT-AT-ANY-PRICE 350 (1999).
47
See Joe Nocera, The Board Wore Chicken Suits, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006.
48
Id.
45
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Home Depot ousted Mr. Nardelli in January of 2007.49 He became
head of Chrysler in August of 2007, hired by Chrysler’s owner, the private
equity fund Cerberus, and resigned in April of 2009 as Chrysler entered
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, returning to Cerberus .50 Of course, Nardelli
headed Chrysler while the economy was in crisis. We cannot know whether
he did a good job; perhaps someone else would have done worse. What is
important is that previously being the CEO at Home Depot seems to have
been sufficient for Nardelli to obtain another CEO job notwithstanding that
he had engendered considerable hostility for his lackluster performance and
high pay package.
The strategy of choosing a new CEO from a small pool of present
or former CEOs is problematic for many reasons. First, the strategy may
not yield the best CEO: another person might have been better.51 Second,
the strategy probably contributes to the high level of CEO compensation
overall.52 It helps perpetuate the illusion that CEO candidates are scarce,53
and amplifies the resonance of a new CEO’s argument that he must be
above the median of his comparison group and therefore should be paid
49

See Michael Barbaro, Embattled Chief Executive Resigns at Home Depot,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007.
50
See Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Chief Says He Believes He Has Saved the
Automaker, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at B5. It is interesting, too, that Mr.
Nardelli’s new employer was a private equity fund whose own financial interests
were at stake. Mark Clothier, Chrysler’s Nardelli To Rejoin Cerberus Without
Golden Parachute, BLOOMBERG, May 1, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aQ.PiZK2OzH0. Who did they need to justify their
hiring decision to? In the community that includes private equity funds, there may
be far more incentive to try to make the best judgment and far less reason to use a
methodology importantly motivated by its justifiability. But the fund does have
some agents too. They have their own often-large financial stakes, but they may
face the same constraints as other agents in needing to justify what they do. The
fund itself may also need justification to its investors if it does not perform as well
as its peers.
51
See KHURANA, supra note 43, at 25. How the market perceives the new
CEO and what it says about the company to choose and gain her services, may
influence how well the company does and hence, how successful the CEO “is” or
seems to be. This might seem to complicate the story that the company is losing
out when it hires the CEO chosen using the accepted strategy rather than the CEO
who would have been chosen because of his skill set. Khurana suggests, however,
that the market perception and its effects will fade over time.
52
Id. at 30.
53
See id. at 30 n.18.
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accordingly.54 Third, the strategy perpetuates the reigning narrative that a
particular person – a “charismatic” CEO, in Khurana’s words – can save
the company.55 CEOs may have a far smaller effect on the performance of
their companies than the narrative suggests – the reigning narrative is
probably a myth.56 Finally, this strategy “restricts access to the CEO
position to those who fit certain socially defined criteria.”57
In sum, if this depiction is correct, firms expend considerable
energy and money chasing a myth. Firms do this in significant part to play
to an outside audience.58 Chasing the myth may also serve to perpetuate it.
Going down this mistaken path also prevents accretion of useful knowledge
regarding CEO search methodologies and desirable CEO characteristics, as
the same approach continues to yield what are arguably less than
satisfactory results.59
B.

PROVIDING FOR REMOTE CONTINGENCIES IN COMPLEX
BUSINESS CONTRACTS

Complex business contracts are notoriously long and filled with
legalese. One significant contributor to their length is provisions relating to
remote contingencies.
An illustration is found in a memorable
“melodrama in three acts” in Anatomy of a Merger,60 a book by James
Freund, a leading mergers and acquisitions lawyer. In one scene in the
melodrama, the senior lawyer chastises the junior lawyer’s first draft of an
acquisition agreement:

54

See id. at 30.
See id. at 20.
56
Id. at 21 (“The widespread, firmly held belief in the overriding importance
of the CEO is all the more noteworthy considering that there is no conclusive
evidence linking leadership to organizational performance.”). See also Noam
Wasserman et al., When Does Leadership Matter? The Contingent Opportunities
View of CEO Leadership 6–7 (Harvard Univ. Strategy Unit, Working Paper No.
02-04, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=278652 (arguing that the
potential influence of a CEO fluctuates over time and is situation-specific).
57
KHURANA, supra note 43, at 49..
58
See id. at 20–21.
59
See id. at 21 (“[B]oards find themselves trapped in an infinite loop of
dashed expectations and CEO churn.”).
60
JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES
FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 479-540 (1975).
55
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And then, in the one place you did a little thinking, Pete, it
seems to me you went too far. I know it’s possible that
they’ll repeal the Copyright Act some day, but it doesn’t
really rise to a level of probability sufficient to warrant
three pages of provisions conditional upon that event.61
In this situation, Pete removes the provision. The senior lawyer,
Freund’s alter ego, is in my experience quite idealized. In my years as a
lawyer, nobody questioned such provisions, and they were therefore never
removed.
This is one important reason why contracts have gotten
appreciably larger over time. The process by which complex business
contracts are written involves starting with a “form” – a document used in a
previous transaction. Contract drafters change only what is inapt; they do
not remove what is unlikely to be needed. In Why Contracts Are Written
in Legalese, I explained that:
[in the course of the transaction or its aftermath,] [t]hings
may go wrong for many reasons. If they do, clients may
blame their lawyers, and senior lawyers may blame their
juniors, regardless of where fault lies. And lawyers may
worry more than is warranted that things will go wrong
and that they will be blamed. Finally, because the form is
one’s point of departure, its provisions necessarily have a
mantle of correctness; deviations have to be, in a sense,
“justified.” Things already written down come prelegitimized – not just in the political sense that there’s no
payoff in challenging them, but also in the psychological
sense that they “look like they belong.” As a result,
deviations from the form, especially more structural or
innovative deviations, are disfavored. Necessary changes
to use the form in the new transaction are more apt to be as
limited as possible to “do the job.” Deletions generally
must meet a high threshold of justification: omitting a
provision because it doesn’t do much, but does clutter up
61

Id. at 500-01, also quoted in Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in
Legalese, 77 CHI-KENT L. REV. 59, 63 (2001).
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the form, rarely suffices. But inclusion of new boilerplate
that doesn’t seem to help but couldn’t hurt requires much
less justification. Contracts get progressively longer and
more cumbersome, and usually not to any positive end.62
The social costs of overly long and technical complex business
contracts are of course much smaller than the social cost of the excess
purchases of subprime securities. And they mostly fall on parties who have
in a sense agreed to bear them. But the costs are not insignificant. The
extra resources spent in drafting, reading, negotiating, printing, and
reviewing contracts over and above what would be needed if the contracts
were leaner are fairly large, especially given the billing rates of the lawyers
at issue and the value of the time of top-level company officials who may
review them; companies pass these costs onto their customers. And of
course the longer and more complicated the contract, the more
opportunities and costs arise for litigation. Moreover, litigation costs also
are borne by taxpayers, who pay for courts.
C.

OTHER EXAMPLES: “STICKY” BUSINESS PRACTICES

Consider the choice to incorporate in Delaware and the choice of a
public company to buy insurance. A good argument can be made that the
decision-makers are influenced more by justification than by trying to
make the best possible decision from a substantive perspective.
1. Delaware Incorporation
Why do so many companies incorporate in Delaware? Very few
companies conduct business in Delaware, yet more than half of all public
companies are incorporated there.63 A great deal of literature exists on this
subject.64 Other states would like to attract incorporation business; there
62

Hill, supra note 61, at 76.
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely
Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J.
OF
DELAWARE,
553,
554
(2002);
About
Agency,
STATE
http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last updated May 27, 2010).
64
See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen
Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF.
63
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have been efforts along those lines, but none that have made an appreciable
dent in Delaware’s market share.65 One explanation, complementary to
many of the explanations in the literature, focuses on justification. At elite
law firms, incorporating new corporations in Delaware is the default norm.
A lawyer attempting to deviate from the norm would have to explain and
justify her decision. Incorporation is typically done by lower-level
attorneys. Thus, the explanation would likely need to be made to the senior
attorney. Such firms’ clients tend to include many people who study the
law firm’s work product carefully; thus, the unusual choice would have to
be explained and justified to a client as well. A typical reason given for
incorporating in Delaware is that the Delaware judiciary is better suited to
resolving corporate disputes: it is more sophisticated and has a quicker
timeline. But very few cases go to court, and many courts follow Delaware
corporate law. 66 What seems likely is overall “stickiness” based on the
comfort of everyone involved with Delaware law and procedure. Decisionmakers do not really investigate alternatives; other states may thus not try

L. REV. 1775 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, Federalism and
Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1168 (1999); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435
(1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve
Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001); Daniel R. Fischel, The ‘Race to the
Bottom’ Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s
Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL. STUD.
251 (1977); Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on
Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, Comment].
65
How much other states try to get incorporation business is a matter of
considerable debate. It is conventionally argued that other states do compete to
get incorporation business. See, e.g., Winter, Comment, supra note 63; ROMANO,
supra note 64; Fischel, supra note 64. Some scholars argue that they do not try
much to get incorporation business because they know they will not succeed
against Delaware. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 63. One state
recently attempting to get incorporation business is North Dakota. See Larry
Ribstein, The North Dakota Experiment, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
&
FIN.
REG.
(Apr.
23,
2007,
11:48
PM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/04/23/the-north-dakota-experiment.
66
See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342, 1345-46 (D.
Nev. 1997).
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as hard to provide them,67 potentially setting up a self-reinforcing dynamic.
In the typical corporate context involving complex business transactions,
there is virtually no chance of being second-guessed and punished for a
choice to incorporate in Delaware unless there is a specific, known reason
to make a different choice. By contrast, the chance of being secondguessed and punished for a choice to incorporate in another jurisdiction
without some affirmative reason for doing so may very well be punished.68
2. Public Company Purchase of Insurance
Why would public companies buy insurance? A great deal of
literature exists on the subject.69 The starting point is that such companies
should be risk-neutral, and therefore should not spend money on insurance
premiums. It must cost more to buy insurance than the expected amount of
any payout the insurance company would make.70 The purchase of
insurance is therefore a puzzle requiring an explanation. Many scholars
have provided explanations, invoking, among other things, risk aversion of
67

See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 63, at 553-57.
My authority for this paragraph is my extensive practice experience and
interviews with many other practitioners. See also John C. Coates IV, Explaining
Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame The Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 130405 (2001) (arguing that adoption of particular takeover defenses is importantly
determined by a particular firm’s practices rather than the client’s needs).
Coates’s article is in a different context than the one discussed in the text, and
hypothesizes an “agency cost” in which the law firm’s interests are being pursued
at the expense of the client’s, but Coates’ argument and the one in this Essay are
related. Law firms settle on a particular practice and do not revisit it; the
mechanism by which this occurs is presumably that individual lawyers are
discouraged from deviating. In the context of takeover defenses, there is a clear
better alternative for the client. For incorporation, there is not. Perhaps there is a
better alternative that could be found through research. Or perhaps one would
arise if the norm to incorporate in Delaware became less sticky.
69
See David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for
Insurance, 55 J. BUS. 281 (1982) (an early influential article posing the puzzle); LiMing Han, Managerial Compensation and Corporate Demand for Insurance, 63 J.
RISK & INS. 381 (1996) (explaining corporate insurance purchases by reference to
managerial risk aversion); see also Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It:
The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. OF LAW & ECON. 541 (2009),
available at http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol5/iss1/art22 (giving alternative
explanations for corporate purchases of insurance).
70
See Mayers & Smith, supra note 69 at 282.
68
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corporate managers,71 expertise by insurance companies,72 or requirements
of the company’s transacting partners.73 Another explanation may be the
one offered here for the purchase of subprime securities and CEO selection
process: that those in charge of making the decisions are looking more to
justification than to the substance of the decision. This may involve an
agency cost, or it may not. The manager may think that if an event occurs
that would have triggered a payout and she has not obtained insurance for
the company, that she will be fired or reprimanded. But the company’s
shareholders might also punish the company in such a case; the manager
might then be serving her company well by obtaining the insurance.
V.

LAW AS PART OF THE PROBLEM

The foregoing has discussed a problem: when a decision-maker
makes a decision intended more to shield her from negative consequences
than to yield the best possible decision. Might law provide a solution?
Law is, unfortunately, often part of the problem.
Law, especially corporate law, encourages process-based
justification, even where the process at issue can be followed fairly
mechanically.74 Consider fiduciary duty law, especially the duty of care
and the duty of good faith under the duty of loyalty. Directors and officers
show that they met their duties by demonstrating that they hired the
appropriate advisors, and had meetings which lasted a sufficient period of
time and conducted enough debate and inquiry.75 There may be a formula
– a true safe harbor, or something close enough – to avoid liability. Using
the court-approved process may not yield a worse decision, but it probably
incurs unnecessary costs in arriving at the decision that probably would
have been arrived at in any event.
71

See Han, supra note 69, at 281-82.
See Goldberg, supra note 68, at 542-43.
73
Id. at 541.
74
See Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the
Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 336
(2009) [hereinafter Hill & McDonnell, Executive Compensation] (characterizing
the post-Van Gorkom process of approving mergers in Delaware as resulting in
“full employment” for investment bankers and lawyers); Claire A. Hill & Brett H.
McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1769, 1772 n.14 (2007).
75
See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 73, at 1769-72; Hill & McDonnell,
Executive Compensation, supra note 73, at 336.
72
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The emphasis on process reflects that courts do not want to
micromanage business. It also reflects a desire to give business people
certainty – to specify ways of proceeding that insulate a decision and the
This ethos echoes, and
decision-maker from further scrutiny. 76
encourages, a mindset favoring justification by formula.77
The next Section argues that one important solution to the problem
is to develop and promote norms against the use of justifications that are
merely acceptable, but not “good.” These norms should encourage
business actors to use their own judgment, even if they can not consult a
formula or an established past or present practice. As discussed above, law
has difficulty in preventing people from using safe harbors as refuges from
doing their own inquiry. But perhaps law can do something to help the
problem. It can allow for more personal liability for business decisionmakers in some cases. It can marshal dicta to encourage better practices,
and can outlaw common practices it finds unsatisfactory. I turn to these
issues in the next Section.
VI.

SOLUTIONS

The foregoing described contexts in which decision-makers made
decisions that the decision-makers had more reason to think were
76

See Hickman & Hill, supra note 7, at 1188.
A recent paper pointing out the extent to which justification can distort
behavior is Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of
Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568884. The authors
discuss how actors’ behavior can be distorted by their need to make the best
evidentiary case to a court. Inefficiency may result since a person may, for
instance, allow behavior that harms her to continue so she can demonstrate that it
occurred. Parchomovsky and Stein’s paper shares with this Essay the idea that the
need to get some desired treatment – avoiding professional censure or getting a
recovery in a lawsuit – can distort behavior and potentially be costly to society.
Parchomovsky and Stein’s paper has some important differences, though. First, in
their scenario, the behavior that does not represent a distortion is known, at least as
a matter of theory. This Essay’s analogue– the best decision from a substantive
point of view – is not known. This is precisely why the problem arises. Second,
demonstrations made to a court are governed by different forces than
demonstrations or justifications to one’s peers. In both instances, law and norms
are relevant. But, to overstate for expository ease, norms inform law to a court,
whereas law informs norms to one’s peers.
77
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justifiable than were substantively good. The decisions have varying
social costs, some quite large and some smaller.
What kind of solutions might be possible? If we characterize the
greater society as having an interest in more critically-minded and less
formulaic decision-making, one approach might be to align the interests of
decision-makers with those of the greater society. One way this might be
achieved is to make decision-makers personally responsible for their
decisions. This might be achieved in several different ways.
One is to make decision-makers personally liable for their
decisions. The liability could arise from the decision’s outcome or from
the process used to reach the outcome. Richard Painter and I have argued
for the former solution in a particular context: highly compensated bankers.
These bankers made risky decisions that allowed their banks to fail or
suffer significant losses. We argued that such bankers should be personally
liable if their banks fail; we would allow them to retain a million dollars of
their own wealth, but no more. Investment banking is a business that can
impose, and has recently imposed, enormous social costs. We argue that
investment banking is presently structured in a manner that rewards
excessive risk-taking. Investment bankers had significant equity stakes in
their banks, and were willing to risk those. We argue that they might not
be willing to risk losing amounts they hold outside the firm that enable
them to maintain their accustomed standard of living.78
Obvious objections exist to our proposal, mostly notably that it
may not be politically feasible.79 But this may change given public disgust
at continuing high banker compensation.80 Even if it does become feasible,
though, it is only a partial solution for highly compensated people in a field
that imposes social costs. Limited liability is a bedrock principle in
business, and it is simply not realistic to advocate abandoning it wholesale.
Thus, many decision-makers making decisions more because the decisions

78

Claire A. Hill & Richard Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond Shareholder
Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1173-74 (2010).
79
Substantive objections include the following: a regulation imposed by the
U.S. or a state would tempt bankers to work where the regulation did not apply;
fewer people would want to be investment bankers; bankers would find ways to
hide their assets; innovation would be stifled as bankers flocked to safety. Id. at
1196-99.
80
See, e.g., Eric Dash, Federal Report Faults Banks on Huge Bonuses, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2010, at A1.
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are justifiable than because they are substantively good could not feasibly
be made guarantors for their decisions.
What about trying to increase oversight of process? If the
oversight is to be done by courts, this does not seem like a promising
solution. As argued in the previous Section, courts, especially those
deciding matters of corporate law, are notoriously reluctant to
micromanage process. Courts are sometimes willing to say directors did
not think long enough; they are not generally willing to say they did not
think hard enough.81 But one related avenue might be promising: trying to
encourage norms and best practices in favor of critical thinking and against
mechanical and formula based decision-making methodologies. Corporate
“law” nowadays very much includes extra-legal forces such as pressure
imposed by major shareholders, through the proxy process as well as the
media.82 Such pressure could make it less “safe” for decision-makers to
follow certain types of established practices. Law could also have a role:
decisions could include dicta encouraging more critical-mindedness. Of
course, critical-minded decision-making is no panacea.
Formulaic
decision-making methodologies may at least impose a lower bound on the
quality of decision-making.83 But it may be realistic to hope that the
decisions at issue, mostly those made by individuals working in an
institutional setting, would be constrained by those institutions, thus
providing a lower bound.
Law can also play another role. It may not be good at dictating the
specifics of good process, but it can be quite good at dictating the specifics
of bad process. In that regard, it can have a more direct role in limiting
“safe harbors.”
It can, for instance, label a particular practice
“unreasonable” as a matter of law. By itself, this may not be sufficient.
Consider that in 1999, the Seventh Circuit characterized reliance on
Standard and Poor’s rating as unreasonable.84 Eleven years later, reliance
continues unabated, notwithstanding Enron and the subprime crisis. But
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court attempts to specify bad process, making “safe harbors” less safe, is an
approach with some potential.
A final approach to consider is that interested parties – perhaps,
industry groups – might be willing to subsidize research on better decisionmaking methodologies. They might be motivated by their collective
interest or perhaps by an interest in avoiding regulation. In cases where
there is a public interest, government, too, can subsidize such research.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Decisions made under uncertainty may be made more with a view
towards justification than with a view towards making the best substantive
decision. Norms may arise as to justifications the decision-maker’s
community will accept; the decision-maker will often be guided by these
norms. The result may be inferior decisions that impose social costs,
sometimes significant ones. This phenomenon matters for law and policy.
Massive overinvestment in subprime securities is an important example.
The problem will not be easy to address. At first blush, law would
not seem a good place to look. The problem involves people taking refuge
in an accepted methodology or practice rather than fully using their critical
faculties. Law notoriously judges actions by reference to accepted norms
in the community; it also notoriously focuses on process rather than
substance.
This Essay aims to draw attention to the breadth of the problem,
showing its roots and manifestations in standard human motivations. The
breadth of the problem has not been appreciated. Might better solutions be
possible if the problem is viewed at a higher level of abstraction? This
Essay aims to raise this possibility, and otherwise inspire new ways of
looking at what may have seemed like diverse phenomena.

